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Abstract: We introduce the class of Obligation rules for minimum cost
spanning tree situations. The main result of this paper is that such rules are
cost monotonic and induce also population monotonic allocation schemes.
Another characteristic of Obligation rules is that they assign to a minimum
cost spanning tree situation a vector of cost contributions which can be ob-
tained as product of a double stochastic matrix with the cost vector of edges
in the optimal tree provided by the Kruskal algorithm. It turns out that the
Potters value (P-value) is an element of this class.
Key-words: minimum cost spanning tree games, cost monotonicity, popu-
lation monotonic allocation schemes.
1 Introduction
A connection problem arises in the presence of a group of agents, each of
which needs to be connected directly or via other agents to a source. If
connections among agents are costly, then each agent will evaluate the op-
portunity of cooperating with other agents in order to reduce costs. In fact,
if a group of agents decides to cooperate, a conﬁguration of links which min-
imizes the total cost of connection is provided by a minimum cost spanning
tree.
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However, solving the cost-minimization problem is only part of the problem:
agents must still support the cost of the minimum cost spanning tree and
then a cost allocation problem has to be addressed.
This class of allocation problems has been tackled with the aid of co-
operative game theory since the basic paper of Bird (1976). For a detailed
discussion of the problem let us refer to the dissertations of Aarts (1994) and
Feltkamp (1995), and to the papers of Granot and Huberman (1981).
Many cost allocation methods have been proposed and, as usual, diﬀerent
properties have been considered as well, also in view of the applied economic
framework. In many applications the cardinality of the set of agents can vary
in time, and also increasing or decreasing of connection costs may occur.
Consider, for instance, a wireless telecommunication network where agents
are operators of transmitters for traﬃc exchange and the source is the cen-
tral hub station. Agents can decide to communicate directly with the main
exchange hub, by means of powerful and very expensive transmitters, or,
alternatively, to cooperate and construct a wireless network of less power-
ful, and consequently, cheaper transmitters. Since transmissions are costly,
such a situation can be handled as a minimum cost spanning tree problem.
Moreover, new owners of transmitters can be willing to enter the network
and the cost of connection can increase (i.e. to improve quality and quantity
of services supplied) or decrease (i.e. by improving telecommunication tech-
nologies). Of course, in all the connection situations suitable to evolve with
time, stability conditions satisﬁed for the original situation cannot guarantee
cooperation among agents also under the new conditions. Therefore many
authors have focused their attention in ﬁnding allocation methods which
can keep, in the most general setting, incentives for cooperation also under
modiﬁcations in the population of agents and in the structure of connection
costs.
In the papers of Kent and Skorin-Kapov (1996), Moretti et al. (2002), and
Norde et al. (2004), the question of the existence of population monotonic
allocation schemes (pmas) (Sprumont (1990)) is central. A pmas provides a
cost allocation vector for every coalition in a monotonic way, i.e. the cost
allocated to some player does not increase if the coalition to which he belongs
becomes larger.
In the paper of Dutta and Kar (2002), cost monotonic allocation rules
have been studied, requiring that the cost allocated to agent i does not
increase if the cost of a link involving i goes down, nothing else changing in
the network.
In this paper, we introduce a class of allocation rules for minimum cost
spanning situations, namely the class of Obligation rules, and show that
they have nice monotonicity properties: cost monotonicity and population3
monotonicity. Actually, our concept is stronger than the concept of cost
monotonicity introduced in Dutta and Kar (2002). We simply impose that
if some connection costs go down, then no agents will pay more.
It turns out that particular rules in this class are the P-value (Branzei
et al. (2003)) and the P ¿-values, for each ordering ¿ of the players (Norde
et al. (2004)). Moreover it is shown that the P-value is the average of the
P ¿-values over all the possible orderings ¿.
We start with some preliminaries in the next section. In section 3 Obliga-
tion rules are introduced starting from the general notion of obligation maps,
and some basic properties are studied. In section 4 it is shown that Obli-
gation rules are cost monotonic and induce population monotonic allocation
schemes.
2 Preliminaries and notations
An (undirected) graph is a pair < V;E >, where V is a set of vertices or
nodes and E is a set of edges e of the form fi;jg with i;j 2 V , i 6= j.
The complete graph on a set V of vertices is the graph < V;EV >, where
EV = ffi;jgji;j 2 V and i 6= jg. A path between i and j in a graph < V;E >
is a sequence of nodes i = i0;i1;:::;ik = j, k ¸ 1, such that fis;is+1g 2 E
for each s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. A cycle in < V;E > is a path from i to i for
some i 2 V . Two nodes i;j 2 V are connected in < V;E > if i = j or if
there exists a path between i and j in E. A connected component of V in
< V;E > is a maximal subset of V with the property that any two nodes in
this subset are connected in < V;E >.
Now, we consider minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. In a
mcst situation a set N = f1;:::;ng of agents is involved willing to be con-
nected as cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a service) denoted
by 0. In the sequel we use the notation N0 = N [f0g. An mcst situation can
be represented by a tuple < N0;EN0;w >, where < N0;EN0 > is the complete
graph on the set N0 of nodes or vertices, and w : EN0 ! I R+ is a map which
assigns to each edge e 2 EN0 a nonnegative number w(e) representing the
weight or cost of edge e. We call w a weight function. Since in our paper
the graph of possible edges is always the complete graph, we simply denote
an mcst situation with set of users N, source 0, and weight function w by
< N0;w >. Often we identify an mcst situation < N0;w > with the corre-
sponding weight function w. We denote by WN0 the set of all mcst situations
< N0;w > (or w) with node set N0. For each S µ N, one can consider the
mcst subsituation < S0;wjS0 >, where S0 = S [ f0g and wjS0 : ES0 ! I R+ is
the restriction of the weight function w to ES0 µ EN0, i.e. wjS0(e) = w(e) for4
each e 2 ES0.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. Two nodes i and j are called (w;N0)-
connected if i = j or if there exists a sequence of nodes i = i0;:::;ik = j in
N0, k ¸ 1, with w(fis;is+1g) = 0 for every s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g.
We deﬁne the set ΣEN0 of linear orders on EN0 as the set of all bijections
¾ : f1;:::;jEN0jg ! EN0, where jEN0j is the cardinality of the set EN0. For
each mcst situation < N0;w > there exists at least one linear order ¾ 2 ΣEN0





For any ¾ 2 ΣEN0 we deﬁne the set
K
¾ = fw 2 I R
EN0
+ j w(¾(1)) · w(¾(2)) · ::: · w(¾(jEN0j))g:
Any mcst situation gives rise to two problems: the construction of a
network Γ µ EN0 of minimal cost connecting all users to the source, and a
cost sharing problem of distributing this cost in a fair way among users. The
cost of a network Γ is w(Γ) =
P
e2Γ w(e). A network Γ is a spanning network
on S0 µ N0 if for every e 2 Γ we have e 2 ES0 and for every i 2 S there
is a path in Γ from i to the source. To construct a minimum cost spanning
network Γ on N0 we use in this paper the Kruskal algorithm (Kruskal (1956)),
where the edges are considered one by one according to non-decreasing cost,
and an edge is either rejected, if it generates a cycle with the edges already
constructed, or it is constructed, otherwise.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. The minimum cost spanning tree
game (N;cw) (or simply cw), corresponding to < N0;w >, is deﬁned by
cw(S) = minfw(Γ)jΓ is a spanning network on S
0g
for every S 2 2Nnf;g, where 2N stands for the power set of the player set
N, with the convention that cw(;) = 0.
We call a map F : WN0 ! I RN assigning to every mcst situation w a
unique cost allocation in I RN a solution. A solution F is eﬃcient if we have P
i2N Fi(w) = w(Γ) for each w 2 WN0, where Γ is a spanning network on N0
of minimal cost. A solution F has the carrier property if Fi(w) = 0 for each
w 2 WN0 and for each i 2 N such that i is (w;N0)-connected to 0.
Finally a population monotonic allocation scheme or pmas (Sprumont





xS;i = c(S) for all S 2 2Nnf;g;
ii) xS;i ¸ xT;i for all S;T 2 2Nnf;g and i 2 N with i 2 S ½ T.5
Note that conditions (i) and (ii) imply that each row of this table is a core
element of the corresponding subgame of the game (N;c) (cf. Sprumont
(1990)).
3 Obligation rules
Let ∆(N) = fx 2 I RN
+j
P
i2N xi = 1g. The sub-simplex ∆(S) of ∆(N) given
by ∆(S) = fx 2 ∆(N)j
P
i2S xi = 1g is called, for reasons to be clariﬁed
later, the set of obligation vectors of S. An obligation function is a map
o : 2N n f;g ! ∆(N) assigning to each S 2 2N n f;g an obligation vector
o(S) 2 ∆(S) in such a way that for each S;T 2 2N nf;g with S ½ T and for
each i 2 S
oi(S) ¸ oi(T): (1)
Such an obligation function o on 2N n f;g induces an obligation map ˆ o :
Θ(N [f0g) ! I RN, where Θ(N [f0g) is the family of partitions of N [f0g,
and ˆ o(µ) =
P
S2µ;0= 2S o(S) for each µ 2 Θ(N [ f0g).
If µ = fN [f0gg, then the resulting empty sum is assumed, by deﬁnition,
to be the jNj-vector of zeroes: ˆ o(µ) = 0 2 I RN.
Example 1 Let o¤ : 2N n f;g ! ∆(N) be deﬁned by o¤(S) = eS
jSj for each
S 2 2N n f;g, where eS is the jNj-vector such that eS
i = 1 if i 2 S and
eS








jS(µ;i)j¡1 if 0 = 2 S(µ;i)
0 otherwise;
for each µ 2 Θ(N [f0g) and each i 2 N. Here S(µ;i) 2 µ is the set to which
i belongs.
Note that o¤(S) is the barycenter of ∆(S) and for N = f1;2;3;4g, µ =
ff1;2g;f0;3g;f4gg we have o¤(µ) = (1
2; 1
2;0;1).
Example 2 Given a bijection ¿ : N ! f1;2;:::;jNjg, let o¿ on 2N nf;g be







1 if ¿(i) = minf¿(k)jk 2 Sg
0 otherwise:
If N = f1;2;3;4g, µ = ff1;2g;f0;3g;f4gg, ¿(1) = 4, ¿(2) = 3, ¿(3) = 1
and ¿(4) = 2, then ˆ o¿(µ) = o¿(f1;2g) + o¿(f4g) = (0;1;0;1).6
Example 3 Let º 2 I RN
++ be a vector of strictly positive real values. Let








j2S ºj if i 2 S
0 otherwise:
Then oº is an obligation function. Note that if ºi = 1 for each i 2 N, then
oº
i(S) = o¤
i(S) for each S 2 2N n f;g, where o¤(S) is as in Example 1.







jSj¡1 if i 2 S and U * S
jUj¡1 if i 2 U and U µ S
0 otherwise:




oU(f1;2;3;4g) = (0; 1
2; 1
2;0). So oU is not an obligation function since it does
not satisfy condition (1).
Remark 1 Let o²;o± : 2Nnf;g ! ∆(N) be two distinct obligation functions.
For each ® 2 [0;1] let o® : 2N nf;g ! ∆(N) be deﬁned by o®(S) = ®o²(S)+












= 1. Moreover, since condition (1) holds both for o² and o±,
condition (1) holds for their convex combination o® too. Therefore, o® is an
obligation function which induces the corresponding obligation map ˆ o®(µ) =
®ˆ o²(µ) + (1 ¡ ®)ˆ o±(µ) for each µ 2 Θ(N [ f0g).
Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. We can consider
a sequence of precisely jEN0j + 1 graphs < N0;F ¾;0 >;< N0;F ¾;1 >;:::;
< N0;F ¾;jEN0j > such that F ¾;0 = ;, F ¾;k = F ¾;k¡1 [ f¾(k)g for each
k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. For each graph < N0;F ¾;k >, with k 2 f0;1;:::;jEN0jg,
let ¼¾;k be the partition of N [ f0g consisting of the connected components
of N0 in < N0;F ¾;k >.
Remark 2 Note that for each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, ¼¾;k is either equal to
¼¾;k¡1 or is obtained from ¼¾;k¡1 by forming the union of two elements of
¼¾;k¡1.
Now we deﬁne recursively a function ½¾ : f0;1;:::;jNjg ! f0;1;:::;jEN0jg
by
² ½¾(0) = 07
² ½¾(j) = minfk 2 f½¾(j ¡ 1) + 1;:::;jEN0jgj¼¾;k 6= ¼¾;½¾(j¡1)g
for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
Note that ¼¾;½¾(i) 6= ¼¾;½¾(j) for each i;j 2 f0;1;:::;jNjg with i 6= j, and
¾(½¾(1));:::;¾(½¾(jNj)) correspond to the jNj accepted edges in the Kruskal
procedure based on the ordering ¾.
Example 5 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 1. Note that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;3g,































Figure 1: An mcst situation with three agents.
The sequence of seven graphs < N0;F ¾;k > and the corresponding se-
quence of partitions ¼¾;k are shown in the following table





4 ff1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3g;f1;0gg fN [ f0gg
5 ff1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3g;f1;0g;f2;0gg fN [ f0gg
6 ff1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3g;f1;0g;f2;0g;f3;0gg fN [ f0gg
Then ½¾(0) = 0, ½¾(1) = 1, ½¾(2) = 2, ½¾(3) = 4.
Deﬁnition 1 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [ f0g). Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0.
The contribution matrix w.r.t ˆ o and ¾ is the matrix D¾;ˆ o 2 I RN£EN0 where
the rows correspond to the agents and the columns to the edges, and where
D
¾;ˆ o
ik = ˆ oi(¼
¾;k¡1) ¡ ˆ oi(¼
¾;k)
for each i 2 N and each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg.8
Some characteristics of the contribution matrix are given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [ f0g). Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0.
Then D¾;ˆ o is a nonnegative matrix for which each row sum is equal to 1 and
the ½¾(j)-th column sum is equal to 1 for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, whereas each
k-th column sum with k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n f½¾(j)jj 2 f1;:::;jNjgg is equal
to 0.
Proof First note that by Remark 2 and the deﬁnition of obligation map the
matrix D¾;ˆ o is nonnegative.









¾;0) ¡ ˆ oi(¼
¾;jEN0j) = 1 ¡ 0 = 1
for each i 2 N.














i2N ˆ oi(¼¾;½¾(j)¡1) ¡
P










for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, where in the last equality we use Remark 2. The
k-th column sums, for each k 2 f1;:::; jEN0jg n f½¾(j)jj 2 f1;:::;jNjgg, are








ˆ oi(¼¾;k¡1) ¡ ˆ oi(¼¾;k)
¢
= 0:
Deﬁnition 2 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [f0g). Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0. We
deﬁne the map Á¾;ˆ o : K¾ ! I RN by
Á
¾;ˆ o(w) = D
¾;ˆ ow
¾; (2)
for each mcst situation w in the cone K¾.
Onwards, let ek 2 I RjEN0j be the column vector such that ek
i = 1 if i = k
and ek
i = 0 for each i 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n fkg. From Proposition 1 it follows






for each j 2 N is a double stochastic matrix (i.e. all entries are nonnegative
and each row sum and each column sum are equal to 1), and
Á






In order to deﬁne Obligation rules properly on the set WN0, we need Lemma
1. In the sequel, recall that, for each t 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, w¾
t is the t-th
coordinate of the vector w¾ as deﬁned in the Preliminaries.
Lemma 1 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [f0g); let ¾ 2 ΣEN0;w 2 K¾.
Suppose that, for some t 2 f1;:::; jEN0j ¡ 1g, w¾
t = w¾
t+1. Then for the
ordering ¾0 2 ΣEN0 such that ¾0(i) = ¾(i) for each i 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n
ft;t + 1g, ¾0(t) = ¾(t + 1) and ¾0(t + 1) = ¾(t), we have that w 2 K¾0 and
Á¾;ˆ o(w) = Á¾0;ˆ o(w).
Proof It is obvious that w 2 K¾0. Let a = w¾
t . Note that ˆ o(¼¾;k) =
ˆ o(¼¾0;k) for all k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg with k 6= t. This implies that w¾
k D¾;ˆ oek =
w¾0
k D¾0;ˆ oek for all k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg with k = 2 ft;t + 1g and
w¾0
t D¾0;ˆ oet + w¾0
t+1D¾0;ˆ oet+1 =
= a(ˆ o(¼¾0;t¡1) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾0;t)) + a(ˆ o(¼¾0;t) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾0;t+1)) =
= a(ˆ o(¼¾0;t¡1) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾0;t+1)) = a(ˆ o(¼¾;t¡1) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾;t+1)) =
= a(ˆ o(¼¾;t¡1) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾;t)) + a(ˆ o(¼¾;t) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾;t+1)) =
= w¾
t D¾;ˆ oet + w¾
t+1D¾;ˆ oet+1:
(5)
So, D¾;ˆ ow¾ = D¾0;ˆ ow¾0 or, equivalently, Á¾;ˆ o(w) = Á¾0;ˆ o(w).
By repeatedly using Lemma 5 we obtain
Proposition 2 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [f0g). If w 2 K¾ \K¾0
with ¾;¾0 2 ΣEN0, then Á¾;ˆ o(w) = Á¾0;ˆ o(w).
This proposition makes it possible to deﬁne an Obligation rule with respect
to an obligation map on Θ(N [ f0g) as a map on WN0.
Deﬁnition 3 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [ f0g). The Obligation
(O-)rule w.r.t. ˆ o is the map Áˆ o : WN0 ! I RN deﬁned by
Á
ˆ o(w) = Á
¾;ˆ o(w) (6)
for each w 2 WN0, where ¾ 2 ΣEN0 is such that w 2 K¾.
Remark 3 The P-value (Branzei et al. (2003)) and the P ¿-values, with ¿ 2
ΣN0, introduced in Norde et al. (2004) and studied in Branzei et al.(2003),
are Obligation rules. In fact Áˆ o¤(w) = P(w) and Áˆ o¿(w) = P ¿(w) for each
¿ 2 ΣN, where ΣN is the set of all bijections ¿ : N ! f1;:::;jNjg.10
Now we make clear why we chose the name “Obligation rule”. Let ˆ o an obli-
gation map on Θ(N [f0g) and let w 2 WN0. According to the corresponding
O-rule Áˆ o, each player i 2 N has to pay fractions of edges summing up to
1, which is the total obligation for player i in the mcst situation w. Stated
diﬀerently, an O-rule allocates the cost of an edge which forms in some step
k, k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, of the Kruskal algorithm to the players in N according
to the k-th column of the contribution matrix D¾;ˆ o, with ¾ 2 ΣEN0 such that
w 2 K¾. After step k, by Proposition 1, the quantity of remaining obliga-




ij = ˆ oi(¼¾;k).
We collect some interesting properties of O-rules in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The O-rules are eﬃcient, satisfy the carrier property and
form a convex set.
Proof Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [ f0g), let w 2 WN0 and let
¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾.





























where the second equality follows from Proposition 1 and where Γ is a
spanning network on N0 of minimal cost. So eﬃciency is proved.
ii) Let i 2 N be a player who is (w;N0)-connected to the source 0. There
exists r 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg such that i is connected to 0 in F ¾;r but not in
F ¾;r¡1 and w(¾(r)) = 0. Moreover, by the deﬁnition of an obligation
map, ˆ oi(¼¾;k) = 0 for k 2 fr;:::;jEN0jg. It follows by (6) that Áˆ o
i(w) =
0 and then it is proved that Áˆ o satisﬁes the carrier property.
iii) Let ˆ o²; ˆ o± and ˆ o®, with ® 2 [0;1], be as in Remark 1. Then
®Áˆ o²(w) + (1 ¡ ®)Áˆ o±(w) =
= ®D¾;ˆ o²w¾ + (1 ¡ ®)D¾;ˆ o±w¾ =
=
¡
®D¾;ˆ o² + (1 ¡ ®)D¾;ˆ o±¢
w¾ =
= D¾;ˆ o®w¾ = Áˆ o®(w)11
for every w 2 WN0 and ¾ 2 ΣEN0 such that w 2 K¾, where the third
equality follows from Remark 1 and the deﬁnition of D¾;ˆ o®. Then it is
proved that the set of O-rules is a convex set.
We end this section with a proposition that enlightens the connection be-
tween the P-value and the P ¿-values, ¿ 2 ΣEN0, according to Remark 3.



















Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾.
To prove (8), note that for each i 2 f1;:::;jNjg, the edge ¾(½¾(i)) con-
nects two disconnected subsets of vertices S;T 2 ¼¾;½¾(i¡1). Then, for each






ji = ¯ D
¾;ˆ o¤
ji = 0.
On the other hand, for players in S[T, we have two possibilities regarding
the position of the source w.r.t. the sets S and T:
i) The source 0 belongs neither to S nor to T implying that for each j 2 T











1 if ¿(j) = minf¿(k)jk 2 Tg and
¿(j) 6= minf¿(k)jk 2 S [ Tg;
0 otherwise.





jSj+jTj whereas the fraction of such orderings ¿ 2 ΣN
such that ¿(j) = minf¿(k)jk 2 Tg is equal to 1
jTj. Then it follows that































Similar arguments hold for each j 2 S too.
ii) The source 0 belongs either to S or to T. Without loss of generality,



















































A similar argument holds if 0 2 T.




An alternative proof of Proposition 4 is given in Branzei et al. (2004).
4 Cost Monotonicity and PMAS
In this section we will discuss some nice monotonicity properties of the O-
rules. First, we provide the deﬁnition of cost monotonic solutions for mcst
situations.
Deﬁnition 4 A solution F : WN0 ! I RN is a cost monotonic solution if for
all mcst situations w; ¯ w 2 WN0 such that w(¯ e) · ¯ w(¯ e) for one edge ¯ e 2 EN0
and w(e) = ¯ w(e) for each e 2 EN0 n f¯ eg, it holds that F(w) · F( ¯ w).
We prove in Theorem 1 that O-rules are cost monotonic; the main step is
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [f0g) and let w 2 WN0. Let
¯ e 2 EN0 and let h > w(¯ e) be such that there is no e 2 EN0 with w(¯ e) <
w(e) < h. Deﬁne ˜ w 2 WN0 by ˜ w(e) := w(e) if e 2 EN0 n f¯ eg and ˜ w(¯ e) = h.
Then: Áˆ o( ¯ w) ¸ Áˆ o(w).13
Proof Let K := fe 2 EN0jw(e) = w(¯ e)g be the set of edges that have
the same cost as ¯ e. Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Without loss of
generality we may assume that ¾¡1(¯ e) = maxf¾¡1(e)je 2 Kg, i.e. ¾ ranks
the edges of K with ¯ e last. By construction we also have ˜ w 2 K¾ and hence
Á
ˆ o(˜ w) = D





where at the inequality we used the fact that ˜ w¾ ¸ w¾ and the fact that the
matrix D¾;ˆ o is nonnegative.
Theorem 1 Obligation rules are cost monotonic.
Proof Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [f0g) and let Áˆ o the O-rule w.r.t
ˆ o. Let w; ¯ w 2 WN0 be as in Deﬁnition 4.
Let H := fh 2 I Rj there is an edge f 2 EN0 s.t. h = w(f) 2 (w(e); ¯ w(¯ e))g.
If H = ; then the statement follows directly from Lemma 2. If H 6= ; write
H = fh1;:::;hkg with h1 < ::: < hk.
Consider the sequence of precisely k + 2 mcst situations w0;:::;wk+1 2
WN0 such that w0 = w, wk+1 = ¯ w and for each r 2 f1;:::;kg, wr(e) = w(e)
for each e 2 EN0 n f¯ eg and wr(¯ e) = hr.
Applying Lemma 2 for each r 2 f1;:::;jHjg, with wr¡1 in the role of w
and wr in the role of ˜ w, it follows that
Á
ˆ o( ¯ w) = Á
ˆ o(wk+1) ¸ Á
ˆ o(wk)::: ¸ Á
ˆ o(w0) = Á
ˆ o(w);
which ﬁnally proves cost monotonicity of O-rules.
By Theorem 1 and Remark 3 the P-value and the P ¿-values, for each ¿ 2 ΣN,
are cost monotonic O-rules. The following example illustrates the cost mono-
tonicity of the P-value.
Example 6 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g





















and w¾ = (10;18;20;24;24;26)t.
Then P(w) = Áˆ o¤(w) = D¾;ˆ o¤w¾ = (16;20;16)t.14
Now we consider the mcst situation < N0; ¯ w >2 WN0 where ¯ w is equal to
w except for edge f1;3g whose cost is now ¯ w(f1;3g) = 26. The contribution
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A
and ¯ w¾ = (18;20;24;24;26;26)t. Therefore
Á
ˆ o¤

































































The following theorem shows that O-rules induce a pmas for the correspond-
ing mcst games.
Before introducing the theorem, we need to introduce some further no-
tations. Let o be an obligation function and ˆ o the corresponding obligation
map. Let S µ N, let oS denote the restriction of o to 2S n f;g and let ˆ oS





for every µ 2 Θ(S [ f0g).
Recall also that if w 2 WN0, then an O-rule Áˆ oS w.r.t the obligation
map ˆ oS and applied to wjS0, i.e. the restriction of the weight function w to
ES0 µ EN0 as deﬁned in the Preliminaries, provides a vector in I RS according
to Deﬁnition 3 w.r.t. the set of nodes S0.
Theorem 2 Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N [ f0g), let Áˆ o the O-rule
w.r.t ˆ o, and let w 2 WN0. Then the table [Áˆ oS(wjS0)]S22Nnf;g is a pmas for
the mcst game (N;cw).





w(fi;jg) if i;j 2 S0
w(fi;jg) + ¸S otherwise
(9)15
where ¸S = 1 + maxfw(fi;jg)ji;j 2 S0g.
Then, in < T 0; ¯ w > each edge with at least one node not in S0 is more
expensive than in < T 0;wjT0 >.
Further, let ¯ ¾ 2 ΣET0 be such that ¯ w 2 K¯ ¾ and let ¾S0 2 ΣES0 be such
that ¾S0(i) = ¯ ¾(i) for each i 2 f1;:::;jES0jg. Then by (9) it follows that
wjS0 2 K¾S0
.
Note that for each i 2 S
Á
ˆ oT
i (¯ w) = Á
ˆ oS
i (wjS0): (10)
This follows from the fact that in < S0;wjS0 > the edges with at least one
node not in S0 are discarded and in < T 0; ¯ w > the edges with at least one node
not in S0 are allowed but they are too expensive. The result is that applying
the Kruskal procedure on < T 0; ¯ w > w.r.t. ¯ ¾ the players in S0 are already
connected to 0 before one of the edges with nodes not in S0 is considered.
So, by deﬁnition of an obligation map, we have that the contribution matrix
with jTj rows and jET0j columns D¯ ¾;ˆ oT is of the form
D








99K players in S
99K players in T n S;
where the four submatrices D¾S0
;ˆ oS;N1;N2 and R are such that:
² D¾S0
;ˆ oS is the contribution matrix w.r.t. to ¾S0 and to ˆ oS with jSj rows
and jES0j columns;
² N1 is the null matrix with jSj rows and jET0j ¡ jES0j columns;
² N2 is the null matrix with jTj ¡ jSj rows and jES0j columns;
² R is a real valued matrix with jTj¡jSj rows and jET0j¡jES0j columns
obtained according to the deﬁnition of the contribution matrix D¯ ¾;ˆ oT.
Hence, for each i 2 S, Á
ˆ oT
i ( ¯ w) = (D¾S0
;ˆ oS ¯ w¾S0
jS0 )i = Á
ˆ oS
i (¯ wjS0) = Á
ˆ oS
i (wjS0),
which yields equation (10). [Here (D¾S0
;ˆ oS ¯ w¾S
jS0)i is the i-th component of the
vector D¾S0
;ˆ oS ¯ w¾S0
jS0 .]
Recall that O-rules are cost monotonic. Since ¯ w(e) ¸ wjT0(e) for each
e 2 ET0, then
Á
ˆ oT
i ( ¯ w) ¸ Á
ˆ oT
i (wjT0); for each i 2 T: (11)16
From (10) and (11) we obtain
Á
ˆ oS
i (wjS0) ¸ Á
ˆ oT
i (wjT0) for each i 2 S: (12)
From (12) and the eﬃciency property it follows that [Áˆ oS(wjS0)]S22Nnf;g is a
pmas for the mcst game (N;cw)
From Theorem 2 and the deﬁnition of a pmas, it follows that O-rules provide
cost allocations which are core elements of the game (N;cw).
Example 7 Consider again the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;
3g and w as depicted in Figure 1. Then the P-value, as the O-rule Áˆ o¤(w)
previously introduced, applied to each mcst situation < S [ f0g;wjS[f0g >,




i (wjS0)]S22Nnf;g;i2S = [Pi(wjS0)]S22Nnf;g;i2S =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
S 1 2 3
123 16 20 16
12 21 21 ¤
13 17 ¤ 17
23 ¤ 22 22
1 24 ¤ ¤
2 ¤ 24 ¤
3 ¤ ¤ 26
Final remarks
This paper considers the class of Obligation rules and studies their mono-
tonicity properties. They cover old results in Branzei et al. (2003) and Norde
et al. (2004). In the former, an axiomatic characterization of the P-value for
mcst situations is given. In the latter, existence of a pmas for mcst games is
proved. In this paper we introduce a class of solutions for mcst situations, the
Obligation rules, which are cost monotonic, induce a pmas and, as already
said in Remark 3, include among others the P-value and the P ¿-values, for
each ¿ 2 ΣN.
Further, it turns out that the class of O-rules is a subclass of the Construct
and Charge rules introduced and studied in Moretti et al. (2004), which are
also deﬁned via a matrix product with the unique diﬀerence that the columns
in the contribution matrix do not necessarily derive from obligation maps.
Of course, other rules which are not of Obligation type can be cost mono-
tonic rules. For instance, the egalitarian rule, which allocates to each player
i 2 N an equal amount of the total cost of the mcst, is cost monotonic but17
it is not an O-rule, since it does not satisfy the carrier property. Moreover,
the cost allocation provided by the egalitarian rule is generically not a core
element implying that this rule does not induce any pmas.
In Proposition 4, we illustrate a strong connection between the P-value
and the P ¿-values, for each ¿ 2 ΣN. In Branzei et al. (2004) we charac-
terize the link between these solutions, based on the notion of irreducible
core. Roughly speaking, given a mcst situation w 2 WN0, the irreducible
core of the mcst game corresponding to w is the core of the concave mcst
game corresponding to a mcst situation which is obtained via an adaptation
of w introduced in Bird (1976). In Branzei et al. (2004), it is proved that the
P ¿-values, with ¿ 2 ΣN, are extreme points of the irreducible core and that
the P-value coincides with the Shapley value of the concave mcst game cor-
responding to the adaptation of w. This last fact is proven in an alternative
way in Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga (2004b).
For axiomatic characterizations of the P-value see Feltkamp et al. (1994),
Branzei et al. (2003), Berganti˜ nos and Vidal-Puga (2004a).
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